

ing of circumstances, history, and future possibilities, all within an overarching theological framework.

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

A brief glance at the rise of “responsibility” as a core theme in ethics yields some insights regarding the relative role of thinking as it impinges on professional responsibility. I begin with Weber’s notion that an ethic of responsibility is one in which “one has to give an account of the foreseeable results of one’s actions.”² In this notion, accountability and responsibility are clearly linked: to be responsible is to be held accountable for one’s actions and their results. Indeed, *holding one responsible* in the sense of accountable is one of the two approaches that Albert Jonsen identifies as dominant in philosophical understandings of responsibility.³ We *attribute* responsibility to people when we hold them accountable: they can be blamed or praised for what they do; their actions may be justly rewarded or punished. To be responsible means “owning up to” our deeds and acts.⁴ Attributing responsibility means expecting agents to defend their actions, to give reasons that hold up to public scrutiny. Agents are not responsible if they act under constraint or ignorance, and responsibility may be mitigated if there are excusing circumstances. But we expect an agent to deliberate, to have clear intentions, and to have motives that are sufficiently transparent to be defensible. This is one clear public meaning of “responsible.” It focuses on actions and their justification.

A second clear public meaning also emerges in philosophical literature. Responsibility is not simply about actions, and it is not simply something attributed to others; it is something that we also claim for ourselves. We grow into responsibility by taking it on ourselves, by becoming responsible people. My mother used to say that I was “overly” responsible. By this, she meant that I took on responsibility where I was not necessarily expected to do so. I worried about things, I worked hard to make them come out right, and I carried a sense of caring for the world around me that left me always feeling responsible. Responsibility in this sense focuses not on particular actions and their justification, but on character and moral agency.

Responsibility requires that we have a “self” or center of integrity. It requires that we exercise foresight into possible consequences of our actions. It requires that we are conscientious about what we do, not simply reacting but deliberating and being serious. Our actions over time should exhibit some

Reflective Responsibility

Karen Lebacqz

What Was I Thinking?! Every one of us has probably at some time in our lives looked back and wondered, “What was I thinking?” In the country-western song by that title, the youth admits he was not thinking.¹ He was carried away by a little white tank top; in the thrall of lust, he did some very stupid things. Whether it is lust or loyalty or love or longing or simply a lapse in judgment, most of us have moments when we have made bad decisions. With the benefit of hindsight—and a big sigh or two—we wonder “what was I thinking?” Or perhaps we ruefully admit: I wasn’t thinking.

The indiscretions of youth may be somewhat forgivable, but those of professionals are less so. Professionals are expected to be responsible, accountable. But what do these elusive terms mean, and what is the role of thinking in responsibility? This essay attempts to answer these questions. I will argue that responsibility requires a certain kind of thinking—a pondering and consider-

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consistency. Finally, we must be willing to be identified with our actions: to be held accountable for them by others. In this second sense, responsibility appears as a virtue, a virtue “which inclines [one] to considered, conscientious, committed conduct.”⁵ This is *appropriation* of responsibility.

Both *attribution* of responsibility and *appropriation* of responsibility are helpful in thinking about supervision. Supervisors are both expected to be accountable for their actions (and help train their supervisees to be similarly accountable) and to take on responsibilities. Minimally, they must take on the responsibilities specified in contracts or job descriptions, and they must perform those responsibilities in ways that are publicly accountable. Both their conduct and their character are at stake. From the history of philosophical discussions of responsibility, we gain at least this much insight. All professionals must think about what they do. They must deliberate, not make excuses, and have intentions that are appropriate to their position. They must be conscientious, committed, and thoughtful. They must “own up to” what they have done. These characteristics alone begin to frame what reflective responsibility might mean in supervision.

THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RESPONSIBILITY

But when we turn from the philosophical to the theological literature, we find that responsibility takes on even deeper meanings. Joseph Bush’s apt review of *The Responsible Self* in this issue is a good beginning place.⁶ While H. Richard Niebuhr was by no means the first or the only theologian to stress responsibility, his brief posthumous study has become iconic: He gives definitive shape to the concept of responsibility as we receive it in the theological world today.

Niebuhr’s model of responsibility revolves around four aspects: response, interpretation, anticipation of response to our action, and understanding that we act within an ongoing community. Niebuhr called the last two “accountability” and “social solidarity,” respectively, though these uses of the terms are rather idiosyncratic. Put together, the four aspects mean that all of our actions, all of our choices, are understood within a framework in which we are responding to prior actions upon us, which we have interpreted both in order to act and in order to anticipate the consequences of our actions—the responses that our actions will generate within the community to which we are accountable. Our actions, for Niebuhr, must “fit” within this overarching framework of attention to the past, anticipation of the future, and interpreta-

tion of the meaning of all actions within an ongoing community. He gives us, as Bush notes, a “cathekontic” ethics—an ethics of the fitting.⁷

Niebuhr contrasted his ethics of the fitting with two other approaches to ethics: the teleological that focuses on results or consequences of an action, and the deontological that focuses on doing one’s duty in accord with rules. It is not enough *simply* to try to maximize good consequences; while results are important, a focus solely on future outcomes neglects important dimensions of ethics. In particular, it neglects past histories. If we have harmed someone in the past, we have responsibilities to them that we do not have to those whom we have not harmed. We have a duty of reparation, for example. In his study of the possibilities of dialogue among different religious traditions, Lewis Mudge suggests that responsibility means “being accountable to humankind for wrongs that have been done in the name of religion.”⁸ Part of the task of interpretation is discerning what past actions mean for present duties. We may have duties of gratitude, reparation, justice, or not-harming that can trump concerns for future outcomes.⁹

But it is also not enough to focus on duties, especially if these are identified with rules. Our particular responsibility in a given situation is never fully defined by a rule. It must be discerned with wisdom and insight. As I write this essay, Haiti struggles to deal with the aftermath of a devastating earthquake. From my small rural hospital in northern California, six members of the medical team (three doctors, three nurses, and an emergency medical technician) are on their way to Haiti to help. They had no specific “duty” to do this; indeed, they may have had to put aside duties to their local patients in order to go. Yet they felt a sense of responsibility to utilize their specialized skills in the crisis situation and assist as best they could. Their response, even if not required by rules or by the stated duties of their professions, is fitting.¹⁰

DETERMINING A FITTING RESPONSE

But how does one determine a fitting response? There is a danger in responsibility ethics that may be illustrated by Joseph Fletcher’s adaptation of the concept. In *Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at Work*, Fletcher deliberately draws on Niebuhr.¹⁰ He focuses on Niebuhr’s first aspect: response. “The factor of response [is] the real key to responsibility,” declares Fletcher.¹¹ In responsibility ethics, the burden is on the action-taker: the question is not ‘what should I do?’ but ‘what should I do?’ Rules will not help us; we must simply decide in the unique and transient situation in which we find

ourselves, responding to the concrete call of the situation and being aware that we may be mistaken and, hence, are ultimately reliant upon grace. For Fletcher, there is only one rule: the rule of love. We respond in love to whatever is happening.

The difficulty is immediately obvious: a stress on response leaves open a question as to the appropriateness of our response. Not all responses are fitting. We may not need rules, but we certainly need some guidance as to how to determine which actions fit best in the situation. Engaged as he was in the “situation ethics” debate of his era, Fletcher eschewed rules. He stressed the “concrete calls and claims of others.”⁴² He stressed the immediacy of response within a framework of love as the ultimate value and guide. He may be on the right track, but his approach seems “thin” at best.

I would argue, as I believe would H. Richard Niebuhr, that our immediate responses can be dangerous. Certainly, the unreflective response is not likely to be the fitting response, even if it is motivated by love. Rather, it is precisely the *reflective* response that fits. The reflective response requires *interpretation*.¹³ As Bush notes in his review, Niebuhr would have us ask first, “What is going on?” The proper answer to this question requires several levels or layers of interpretation. There is the immediate situation as it first appears to us. There is also, however, the meaning of that situation as it is enmeshed in systems and structures—the “context” of the situation. And finally, for Niebuhr, as for other Christian ethicists who have stressed responsibility, there is a deeper level of interpretation, in which we must ask what God is doing in the situation. I will return to this last layer below, but first I want to say a bit about other levels of interpretation.

BENEATH THE SURFACE OF A SITUATION

Here, I find helpful William Schweiker’s extended discussion of responsibility ethics.¹⁴ Schweiker finds in the literature on responsibility ethics three different foci. Some authors stress the moral *agent* or decision-maker; some stress the *social setting*; and some stress *dialogue*—responsibility as “response.”¹⁵ Most theologians, he argues, are in the dialogue camp. Their basic model is one of “call-response.” Certainly H. Richard Niebuhr and Karl Barth fit into this model, as would Fletcher. But Schweiker suggests that responsibility ethics must be able to account for all three foci. For instance, I would argue that, in the supervision setting, social roles are crucial to determining responsibilities. While one is always responding to God’s actions

in the world, one’s responses may be limited or largely determined by role expectations. Indeed, to the extent that we *bear* responsibility or can be *held* responsible, our roles may be central. Thus, the call-response model must be enhanced by attention to social settings. Even the *assumption* of responsibility, which has largely to do with agency and character, can be wrong if we are assuming responsibilities that do not fit our social roles.

But Schweiker wants us to think about responsibility even more deeply than this. Indeed, he argues that the call-response model that H. Richard Niebuhr gives us is inadequate to our modern context. True responsibility, in Schweiker’s view, depends on what *values* are basic to our moral life.¹⁶ Always when we act, we are choosing values to promote. Often we must make tough decisions among competing values. Schweiker therefore argues that the very integrity of existence is at stake, and that “responsibility ethics” should be less about response and more about discerning the values to protect and promote. He therefore argues for what he calls “radical interpretation,” which is “reflective, critical inquiry aimed at the question of what has constituted our lives in terms of what we care about and what ought to guide our lives under the demand of respect for others.”¹⁷ At root here, Schweiker is concerned that we live our lives not in an ongoing search for power but in a manner that will enhance community and respect others as persons.⁸

For my purposes, however, what is central is the idea of “radical interpretation.” I once described feminist thinking as schizophrenic. By that I meant that feminists must always function on at least two levels at once: we see what is going on, but we ask not simply “What is happening?” but “What is going on underneath the surface?” On the surface, it may appear that someone is fired for inadequate work; but underneath the surface, charges of inadequacy may be an excuse for what is, at root, a festering sexism. There may be a pattern in which it is consistently women whose work is found “inadequate” and who are fired. Feminists look for patterns, not just for situations. It is this key element of pattern recognition that is implied by H. Richard Niebuhr’s stress on interpretation rather than simply on response. We need to ask “What is going on?” not simply on the surface, but underneath the surface. Radical means “to the roots.” We must get at the roots of what is happening.

For true radical interpretation, I would argue that even pattern recognition is not enough. There is a deeper layer of interpretation that must be included in the work of asking “What is going on?” Sometimes we are scarcely aware of what is going on, but, to be responsible, we need to be aware. Suppose, for instance, that there is sexism at play, but it is unrecognized. The work

of philosopher Iris Marion Young is instructive here. In *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Young tackles the question of our pre-reflective responses to those who are “different.”¹⁹ Drawing on the work of French feminist Julia Kristeva, Young notes that we often have an instinctive, pre-reflective aversive response to difference. We draw back, for example, when we encounter someone who looks different.²⁰ Most philosophers would say that what we experience as instinctive or pre-reflective is not a matter of justice or injustice. Young disagrees. Aversive responses are not simply “instinct.” They are culturally induced and reinforced responses, and as such, are a proper subject for attributing judgments of justice or injustice. We are responsible, Young argues, for examining the cultural context that has led us to such a pre-reflective response.

SEEING THE HAND OF GOD AT WORK

The levels of interpretation that we bring to any situation are therefore crucial. We must analyze the situation, looking for patterns and for hidden or pre-reflective patterns that may be a clue to what is really happening. But there is yet more. As Gustafson and Laney note, interpretation must be not only “an assessment of what is going on, in factual terms” but also an assessment of “what ought to go on, in normative terms.”²¹ The fitting response is not necessarily what we immediately want to do. To be responsible, we must chart a course between conformity to laws, rules, or role expectations and openness to what is happening and what *should* be happening. This requires, I would suggest, interpretation of the situation, the context, ourselves, and God’s actions and desires.

For Niebuhr, interpretation itself will be suspect unless it is brought under the widest and strongest possible lens. “History is the story of God’s mighty deeds and of man’s response to them.”²² It is not enough to see patterns in events or to look for hidden meanings. We must learn to see in events and patterns the hand of God at work. This gives us the sense of what “ought” to be happening. Here, Niebuhr stands in a long line of Christian thinkers, who see in the world around them the actions of a loving God and who are then “called” by God to respond. From the great Roman Catholic theologian Bernard Haering to famed Protestant resister Dietrich Bonhoeffer, numerous Christian theologians argue that we can perceive in the world around us a message from God and that our purpose is to participate in God’s designs for the world. There is no ethical dualism in “responsibility” ethics: the world *is* the arena in which God calls and we respond. Or, as Niebuhr put it, “God

is acting in all actions upon you. So respond to all actions upon you as to respond to [God’s] action.”²³ Thus, the patterns that we are to recognize are the patterns of God’s actions. Through our finite interpretations and actions, we are responsible to the Infinite.

Finally, then, we arrive at what Gabriel Moran considers the key to responsibility as the concept takes shape in contemporary times: we are not simply responsible for our actions, but responsible to something.²⁴ For Christians, that “something” is God. For others, laments Moran, the concept of responsibility has been stripped of its roots and is in danger of collapsing. What we are responsible for depends on what we are responsible to; lacking a clear sense of to whom or to what we are responsible, we risk emaciating the concept of responsibility. We must “hear” the demands of the situation. For Moran, then, “moral deficiency is mostly a hearing failure.”²⁵

To whom or to what do we listen and how do we hear? Listening to ourselves is only the first step; we must listen to the past as well. We may not be responsible for the past, suggests Moran, but we are responsible to it and must listen to what it would tell us. Similarly to Young, then, Moran notes that we are shaped by the intellectual and cultural situation and by the overlapping communities and organizations in which we move. All responsibility is both personal and corporate, he suggests. Marie Fortune picks up this sense of responsibility to and for organizations and communities in her essay in this issue.²⁶ We function, suggests Fortune, within institutions that set standards and expectations for pastoral roles of leadership within communities that are vulnerable and trusting. The patterns that she would have us “hear” include patterns of power, vulnerability, risk, and the structures of our professional practice. Only the supervisor who attends to these important patterns will act in a fitting way. Only the supervisee who learns to hear risk and vulnerability will be prepared to be reflectively responsible. Faith communities are responsible for setting standards that ensure, at a minimum, that their leaders do no harm. Structures of accountability are vital.

STRUCTURES OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Indeed, the importance of structures of accountability may be illustrated by a controversy bordering on scandal that has erupted recently in the scientific world. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has produced consensus documents for the United Nations to use in developing policies on climate change. In November of 2009, e-mails were leaked

to the press suggesting that the work of some of the scientists was biased and unsupported by evidence.²⁷ The IPCC had to admit that some of its predictions were based on unsupported evidence. The attack was not only on the integrity of specific scientists, but on the structures of accountability of the IPCC itself. While its chair has rigorously defended the work of the IPCC,²⁸ public doubt and distrust began to grow, leading to a recent editorial by the president of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences on the question of how to ensure accountability within the scientific community.²⁹ The Academy is considering various ways to shore up its structures in order to ensure accountability for the accuracy and reliability of evidence used in policy making.

Structures of accountability are crucial in all professional work. Indeed, I would join William F. May in going further: structures are important not only for ensuring accountability, but also because they “supply the forms through which the energies of the people of God can bloom.”³⁰ Those who eschew rules sometimes assume that all structures simply constrict. To the contrary, good structures enable flourishing. Children need not only love but boundaries in order to grow up strong and healthy. Churches need not only love but structures in order to grow strong and healthy. Niebuhr did not stress structures, and Schweiker may be correct to argue that Niebuhr’s model is not adequate to the complexity of our current situation. I would argue, however, that Niebuhr’s stress on *interpretation* leads us in the direction of recognizing the importance of structures for complex institutions³¹

This, then, brings us to a crucial point regarding interpretation: the question of freedom. In my view, one of Niebuhr’s most important contributions to responsibility ethics is his understanding of the role of freedom. Where Fletcher seemed to interpret *freedom* as freedom to act, Niebuhr puts the stress on freedom to interpret—specifically, to reinterpret. The self, suggests Niebuhr, is not stuck with the past as received. We can see in it new possibilities, new meanings, new ways in which God has been and is at work in our midst. In short, we can reinterpret the past.³² Take, for instance, the person who suffered abuse as a child. The trauma left from that abuse tends to shape an entire lifetime. But the adult has the possibility of seeing the abuse in a new way—of coming to understand, for instance (perhaps after long and painful years), that the abuser may have been herself abused or trapped within a hopeless cycle of pain and addiction. When we can look with compassionate eyes at those who have harmed us, we can see them in a new light. We can reinterpret their actions. We are freed, not from the abuse itself, but from the

previous hold that it had on our lives. To be sure, this is not an easy path. But it is a possibility for those who genuinely believe that God is acting in everything, as Niebuhr would proclaim. Niebuhr therefore urges us to study our social history and reexamine, generation after generation, national tragedies such as slavery. The past must be remembered, accepted, and reinterpreted.

In *Professional Ethics: Power and Paradox* I argued that one of the key tasks of the pastor is to name or define reality.³³ There is a power in naming that is familiar to any reader of the Bible: names are changed to signify important shifts in social location, to symbolize new beginnings, to rejoice at new freedoms. This power of naming is also the power of reinterpretation. It is what therapists work so hard to do with their clients. Freedom comes when we see differently and the past no longer has a hold on us but opens up to new possibilities.

INTERPRETING IN THE LIGHT OF GOD’S PURPOSES

Finally, then, we arrive at the key for any Christian who would be reflectively responsible: all events must be interpreted and responded to in light of God’s actions and purposes in the world. For Barth, God has made us responsible and we are to witness to God’s grace in all our decisions and actions.³⁴ For Haering, the Christian in all relationships—to oneself, to others, to the world of creatures and nature—perceives a word and message that comes ultimately from God.³⁵ For Bonhoeffer, God loved the world and reconciled it to Godself; hence, as we act in the world we are to participate in the reality of the fulfilled will of God.³⁶ For Niebuhr, as we have already seen, we are to respond to all actions upon us as though we are responding to God’s actions. We respond in all responses to the One who is the source of our being.³⁷ As Bonhoeffer puts it, “...responsibility is a total response of the whole [person] to the whole of reality.”³⁸

This means that every action must be taken within the widest possible framework. Here, we can certainly pick up the elements of accountability and social solidarity that Niebuhr incorporated in his understanding of an ongoing community of agents. But we must be careful that we not limit our ongoing community to the immediate community in which we act. Fortune is correct that “practically we are accountable to those who credential us to serve,” but “ultimately we are accountable to our faith community and to God.”³⁹ While she puts emphasis on our practical accountability within credentialing structures, I draw our attention here to the wider framing of issues. Indeed,

I would follow Robert Johann here: our action must be adequate to the demands and exigencies not simply of the occasion, but of a “reality” that is in continual creation.

Part of the problem with rules is that they tend to serve only static reality. If we are to serve the Infinite, which is never static, we must be attuned not only to rules that have served well in the past but to the possibilities of the future. Put in more theological language, I would say that we must be oriented to redemption, not to creation. How can the potentialities of being best be realized? Attention to power, risk, vulnerability, and structures are a good beginning point, but they must also be placed within a framework of attention to the ultimate purposes of God’s redeeming activity—love, justice, peace, and plenty. The book of Revelation must be as important in our ethical thinking as the book of Genesis. Genesis gives us our origins, but Revelation gives us a vision of our ultimate destiny; both “nature” and “destiny” matter to ethical discernment.

Orienting ourselves toward future possibilities and trying to be “responsible” to them may mean that we must move from “routine” or “conventional” responsibility to what Mudge, drawing on Winston Davis, calls “transcending” responsibility.⁴⁰ For many of us in our roles as supervisors, “routine” responsibility will be adequate. Of course, because we must attend not only to the immediate situation but also to those deeper, more hidden, cultural and institutional levels, we deal with “complex” responsibility as well. But in our contemporary world, we are sometimes drawn into complexities that defy easy interpretation. In these situations, we are pulled toward “transcending” responsibility—a responsibility that seems to go beyond what any person or institution is routinely responsible for, pulling us into uncharted territory. New paradigms may be needed. For instance, the paradigms of power, risk, and vulnerability have long served us well in the arena of professional ethics and supervision; but as our world becomes increasingly a global arena, even these terms may not be adequate and we may need to find new frameworks for thinking about supervision and its responsibilities.

In short, then, reflective responsibility requires what Moran calls a “discriminating intelligence.”⁴¹ We must decide which information is worth our attention and what it means for past, present, and future. We must look for patterns. We must look for hidden implications. We must be able to discern what Roman Catholic theology calls “the signs of the times.” In short, we must think. Anytime we ruefully admit, “I was not thinking,” something is wrong.

There is a failure of accountability, a lapse of responsibility. Anytime we must ask, “What was I thinking?” we already know that something is amiss.

Reflective responsibility requires all the characteristics named in philosophical literature: attention to motive, intentions, absence of excuses, presence of careful deliberation, consideration of alternatives, and consequences, conscientiousness, and commitment. But reflective responsibility also requires something else. Reflective responsibility is a response to the call and claim of God in our lives, and only when we place our actions within this framework are we fully responsible. This is a tall order. It is no wonder that Bonhoeffer cautions us that we can never lay claim to our own righteousness but must depend on the grace of God and be willing to accept guilt.²

Here, we are helped by understanding that responsibility is built into our very being as humans. We are the “responsible” animal. We do not simply “respond,” as do other animals to their environments, their enemies, their lusts. We are given what Mudge calls the “gift” of responsibility: we can assess and plan and be accountable; we can take responsibility for our responses; we can think through what is demanded by the situation; we can place that situation into broader and broader frameworks; we can analyze our own feelings and reactions so that they do not have the same hold over us that they would otherwise have. In all of these ways, we can be reflectively responsible.

NOTES

1. Dierks Bentley, “What was I Thinkin’,” compact disc, 2003, Capitol. In a key line, the singer admits “I know what I was feeling, but what was I thinking?”
2. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in *On Being Responsible*, ed. James Gustafson and James Laney (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 301; quoted in Gabriel Moran, *A Grammar of Responsibility* (New York: Crossroad, 1996), 46.
3. Albert R. Jonsen, *Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics* (Washington, DC: Corpus Books, 1968), chap. 3.
4. Lewis S. Mudge, *The Gift of Responsibility: The Promise of Dialogue Among Christians, Jews, and Muslims* (New York: Continuum, 2008), 7.
5. Jonsen, *Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics*, 69.
6. Joseph E. Bush Jr., “Review Essay of Niebuhr’s *The Responsible Self*,” *Reflective Practice* 30 (2010): 59–63.
7. *Ibid.*, 60.
8. Mudge, *The Gift of Responsibility*, 8.

9. Weber contrasted an ethic of responsibility with an ethic of "ultimate ends" in which one might ignore some of these particulars in order to achieve a final outcome. While Weber saw the two approaches to ethics as complementary rather than contradictory, it is clear that he preferred the "responsibility" approach that attends to particulars. See Moran, *A Grammar of Responsibility*, 46–48.
10. Joseph Fletcher, *Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at Work* (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 1967).
11. *Ibid.*, 231.
12. *Ibid.*, 233.
13. In his study of "Abrahamic" responsibility, Mudge also stresses interpretation: "among the requirements of realizing this Abrahamic responsibility... is the need responsibly to interpret sources, words, and actions" (Mudge *The Gift of Responsibility*, 9).
14. William Schweiker, *Responsibility and Christian Ethics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
15. Schweiker, *Responsibility and Christian Ethics*, 40–41.
16. Schweiker, *Responsibility and Christian Ethics*, 107–108.
17. Schweiker, *Responsibility and Christian Ethics*, 176.
18. Schweiker responds in part to the challenge of Hans Jonas. Jonas argued that human power had vastly increased and that this changes the nature of human action and, hence, of responsibility. For Jonas, then, power is a central issue in determining what responsibility can mean in the modern world. See Hans Jonas, *The Imperative of Responsibility: in Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
19. Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), chap. 5.
20. I would note that it is precisely such "instinctive," aversive responses that often cause great pain for people with physical disabilities, particularly facial deformities. See, for instance, Lucy Grealy, *Autobiography of a Face* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 7: "The pain these children brought with their stares engulfed every other pain in my life."
21. James Gustafson and James T. Laney, "Introduction" in *On Being Responsible: Issues in Personal Ethics*, ed. James Gustafson and James T. Laney (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 13.
22. Albert R. Jonsen, *Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics* (Washington, DC: Corpus Books, 1968), 134.
23. H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Responsible Self* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 126.
24. Moran, *A Grammar of Responsibility*, 72.
25. Moran, *A Grammar of Responsibility*, 85.
26. Marie M. Fortune, "Healthy Boundaries. Healthy Ministry," *Reflective Practice* 30 (2010): 24–33.

27. Eli Kintisch, "Stolen E-mails Turn Up Heat on Climate Change Rhetoric," *Science* 326 (December 4, 2009): 1329.
28. Pallava Bagla, "Climate Science Leader Rajendra Pachauri Confronts the Critics," *Science* 327 (January 29, 2010): 510.
29. Ralph J. Cicerone, "Ensuring Integrity in Science," *Science* 327, no. 5966 (February 5, 2010): 624.
30. William F. May, *Beleaguered Rulers: The Public Obligation of the Professional* (Louisville, KY: Westminster, 2001), 216.
31. I find it ironic that Liberty Mutual has now adopted "responsibility" as its theme and slogan: "When people do the right thing, it's called responsibility; when a company does it, it's Liberty Mutual."
32. Niebuhr, *The Responsible Self*, 102–105.
33. Karen Lebacqz, *Professional Ethics: Power and Paradox* (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1985).
34. Jonsen, *Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics*, 84–85.
35. *Ibid.*, 92.
36. *Ibid.*, 119.
37. *Ibid.*, 145.
38. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, trans. Neville Horton Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 258.
39. Fortune, "Healthy Boundaries. Healthy Ministry," 24
40. See Mudge, *The Gift of Responsibility*, 103ff.
41. Moran, *A Grammar of Responsibility*, 72.
42. Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 234–240.